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On the sub-optimality of entry fees in auctions
with entry
Ángel Hernando-Veciana
Abstract We study a variation of Myerson’s (1981) model in which we allow
for uncertainty about the number of bidders. In our set-up, an appropriate
reserve price in a standard auction maximizes the auctioneer’s expected reve-
nue. However, entry fees can be optimal only under some special conditions.
Basically, theremust be some homogeneity in bidders’ beliefs about the number
of bidders and the auctioneer must know, to some extent, these beliefs.
Keywords Optimal auction · Exogenous number of bidders · Reserve price ·
Entry fee
JEL Classification Numbers D44
1 Introduction
In real-life, auctioneers often use reserve prices to enhance their expected
revenue, however, entry fees are very seldom used, at least in what we can term
small or popular auctions, such as traditional auction houses like Christie’s or
Sotheby’s, newborn internet auctions like eBay or Yahoo, or some second hand
markets organised through auctions like those in London for second hand cars
or second hand homes. Another illustration of this fact is that the thorough
study of Cassady (1967) about auctioning dedicates several pages to the effect
of a reserve price but no comment on entry fees.
This observation, however, contrasts with the theoretical analysis of auctions.
Myerson (1981), for instance, proves that under certain assumptions an appro-
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priately chosen entry fee does aswell as a given reserve price in terms of auction-
eer’s expected revenue. Moreover, Milgrom and Weber (1982), Engelbrecht-
Wiggans (1993), or Levin and Smith (1994) show that once we introduce some
variations in Myerson’s (1981) model,1 the former indifference is broken in
favour of entry fees.
In our paper, we provide an alternative variation of Myerson’s (1981) model
in which reserve prices are optimal in the sense of maximizing the auctioneer’s
expected revenue but, in general, entry fees are not. The distinct feature of our
model is that the bidders and the auctioneer have some exogenous uncertainty
about the total number of bidders. Cassady (1967) and McAfee and McMillan
(1987) have argued that this is a realistic assumption for many real-life auctions,
mostly those we mention above.
The intuitionof our result canbeunderstood fromMyerson’s (1981)Revenue
Equivalence Theorem: he shows that under certain assumptions, in particular a
fixed number of bidders, any auction that only allocates the good to the bidder
with the highest value if above an optimal cut-off is revenue maximizing. Many
auction formats allocate the good to the bidder with highest value who enters
the auction. In this case optimality usually reduces to choosing a reserve price
and an entry fee that induces the optimal level of entry, i.e that bidders enter
the auction if and only if their value is above the optimal cut-off.
We show that a similar result also holds true when there is some exogenous
uncertainty about the number of bidders. Thus, it is easy to see that an appropri-
ate auction set-up, e.g. a second price auction, with a reserve price equal to the
optimal cut-off and no entry fee, maximizes the auctioneer’s expected revenue.
However, auctions with entry fees are not optimal in general.
To understand our result note that in ourmodel, as inMyerson’s (1981), there
is always an entry fee that induces a given bidder to enter the auction if and
only if her value is above the optimal cut-off. However, this entry fee depends
on the bidder’s beliefs about the actual number of bidders. The more bidders
she expects to meet in the auction, the less inclined she will be to pay the entry
fee. Thus, if there is some heterogeneity in these beliefs, we cannot find an entry
fee that induces all bidders simultaneously to take the optimal entry decisions.
Moreover, even if the bidders hold the same beliefs, the auctioneer will not be
able to compute the optimal entry fee unless he knows the bidders’ beliefs.
We also argue that the use of an entry fee induces bidders to acquire private
information about the number of bidders, which typically generates heteroge-
neity on bidders’ beliefs and auctioneer’s uncertainty about the bidders’ beliefs.
Thus, if the cost of information acquisition is sufficiently low, we cannot expect
entry fees to be optimal.
From a technical point of view, the most closely related paper is by McAfee
and McMillan (1987). They also characterise the optimal auction in a model
in which bidders have uncertainty about the number of bidders. McAfee and
McMillan, however, do not compare auctions with reserve prices and entry fees
1 An exception is the model by Waehrer et al. (1998) which we comment on at the end of the
Introduction.
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in terms of expected revenue. Moreover, our model generalises McAfee and
McMillan’s results to the case in which bidders have private information about
the number of bidders.
Levin and Ozdenoren (2004) have another technically related model. They
also study a model in which bidders have exogenous uncertainty about the
number of bidders. Their model, however, differs in that they do not assume a
common prior. Moreover, they do not consider the use of entry fees or reserve
prices.
Some other papers compare entry fees and reserve prices. The most closely
related models are in the papers by Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993), and by Levin
and Smith (1994). In both cases there is variation in the number of bidders,
although endogenous. The former paper points out that an entry fee can imple-
ment full surplus extraction, and the latter one shows that this is not the case
for reserve prices, and thus that an appropriate entry fee strictly dominates any
reserve price. However, what they call an entry fee should more appropriately
be called an inspection fee: bidders only learn their value after paying it. Hence,
an entry fee can extract the bidders’ surplus because bidders have no private
information at the time they pay the inspection fee. A reserve price cannot do
so well because it is paid only once the bidders have their private information
and thus, the auctioneer cannot extract all the bidders’ informational rents.
Milgrom and Weber (1982) show that affiliation among the private informa-
tion of bidders about their values can also make entry fees be revenue superior
to reserve prices. Note that in our model we assume the independent private
valuemodel to avoid the effects inMilgrom andWeber’s model interfering with
our results.
On the other hand, Waehrer et al. (1998) show that a risk averse auctioneer
strictly prefers an appropriate reserve price to any entry fee. Our model, how-
ever, differs in that Waehrer et al. (1998) do not allow for uncertainty about the
number of bidders and that we assume that the auctioneer is risk neutral.
The paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2 we present the set of assumptions
that describe the basic features of our model. We move in the third section to
our main results: characterisation of the optimal auction, optimality of reserve
prices and sub-optimality of entry fees. In the fourth section, we consider the
incentives of bidders to acquire information. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We study a generalisation of a model by McAfee and McMillan (1987). In
their model an auctioneer puts up a single unit of a non-divisible good for sale.
There is a set of potential bidders indexed by the natural numbers N. They also
assume that there is an exogenous random process that picks the set of active
bidders, which we denote by B, from the set of potential bidders. These are the
bidders that can participate in the auction, if they find it profitable. The active
bidders’ preferences are characterized by a von Neumann-Morgenster utility
function equal to vi − p when Bidder i gets the good and pays p, and equal to
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−p when she does not get the good but pays p. We shall refer to vi as Bidder i’s
value. Each bidder’s value is assumed to be private information and to follow
an independent distribution F with support [0, 1] and density f .
Our model differs from McAfee and McMillan’s (1987) in that we assume
that each active bidder, say Bidder i, receives a private signal Si, with support
Si, informative of the set of active biddersB. Note that in the model byMcAfee
and McMillan (1987) bidders may have different (hierarchies of) beliefs about
the set of active bidders B because the fact of being active gives Bidder i infor-
mation aboutB, in particular the event {B  i}. However, this information is not
private since the auctioneer can infer it upon observing the bidder’s identity. For
simplicity we assume that the support Si of each of the signals Si is countable.
Note that this means that the set
∏
i∈N Si is also countable.
We denote by Pr[.] the probability measure that describes the common prior
that generates B and the signals Si’s. We also denote by Pr[.|.] the probability
of the event on the left side of the vertical bar conditional on the event on
the right side of the vertical bar. Finally, we denote by E[.] and E[.|.] the cor-
responding expected values associated to the common prior. We shall assume
that E[N|A] < ∞ for any event A with positive probability (with respect to
the probability measure Pr), and whereN denotes here and in what follows the
cardinality of B.
We also assume that the distribution of B and the Si’s is independent of the
distribution of the bidders’ values. This assumption is a direct generalisation of
the assumption of McAfee and McMillan (1987) that the distribution of B is
independent of the distribution of the bidder’s values.
Finally, we shall restrict ourselves, as McAfee and McMillan (1987) do in
their analysis of optimal auctions, to what Myerson (1981) called the regular
case. This is the case in which the function v− (1−F(v))/f (v) is strictly increas-
ing in v ∈ [0, 1]. This assumption is quite standard in auction theory and it is
satisfied by many distribution functions (e.g. the uniform). We shall denote by
v∗ the unique solution to v∗ − (1 − F(v∗))/f (v∗) = 0 and assume for simplicity
that v∗ exists and belongs to the interval (0, 1).
The model described above has three important assumptions. The first one is
that we assume the independent private valuemodel. Private value is not essen-
tial for our results (they also hold in an independent common value model),
however, independence plays an important role. It avoids the effects shown by
Milgrom and Weber (1982) interfering with our analysis, as we discuss in the
Sect. 1.
The second important assumption is that we assume symmetry across bidders
in their beliefs about the values of the other bidders. This assumption plays an
important simplifying role. Basically, it allows us to avoid the difficulties inher-
ent in the analysis of asymmetric auctions. However, this assumption may seem
to be in conflict with the fact that we allow for heterogeneity in bidders’ beliefs
with respect to the number of active bidders.
The third important assumption is that we assume that the bidders’ informa-
tion about the set of active bidders is orthogonal to their information about the
other bidders’ values. This assumption greatly simplifies the analysis. Moreover,
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had we not made this assumption, we would require additional restrictions to
ensure that there exists homogeneity in bidders’ beliefs about the other bidders
values, see the previous paragraph.
3 Optimal auctions
In this section we show that a standard auction, see below, with an appropriate
reserve price is optimal, in the sense of maximising the auctioneer’s expected
revenue, but in general, standard auctions with a strictly positive entry fee are
sub-optimal.
Formally, we define a standard auction with a reserve price r and an entry
fee e as an auction in which bidders must take a participation decision and a
bid decision as follows. If a bidder does not enter the auction, she pays nothing
but cannot submit a bid. If a bidder enters the auction, she pays the entry fee
e and has the opportunity of submitting a bid no lower than the reserve price r
after observing the number of bidders who have also entered the auction. The
bidder that wins the auction is chosen according to some predetermined rule
among those bidders who submit bids, if any. A bidder who enters the auction
and does not get the good only pays the entry fee e. The bidder who submits
the winning bid pays a price on top of the entry fee e. This price is fixed by a
predetermined rule somewhere between the winner’s bid and the reserve price.
The family of auction mechanisms that we just described include the first
price auction and the second price auction with reserve price and entry fee, but
they exclude some types of all pay auctions.
It is convenient for our analysis to define formally a second price auction
with a reserve price. This is a standard auction in which each bidder submits
simultaneously and independently either one bid above the reserve price r or
no bid at all. The bidder who submits the highest bid, if any, gets the good and
pays, on top of the entry fee, the highest bid of the other bidders, or if there
is no other bid, the reserve price r. Note that if the entry fee is equal to zero,
e = 0, it is weakly dominant for an active bidder with value v to submit a bid
equal to her value if her value is greater than the reserve price r, and to submit
no bid otherwise.
Next, we characterize the set of optimal auctions:
Proposition 1 An auction is optimal if and only if:
(i) The good is allocated to the active bidder with highest value if higher than
v∗, and otherwise, the auctioneer retains the good.
(ii) Any active bidder with a value 0 gets zero expected utility for any realization
of her private signal Si.
Proof Suppose, first, that the auctioneer could observe the realization of the
private signal Si of each active bidder. This case is equivalent to an alternative
model in which there is no signal and the set of potential bidders is equal
to
∏
i∈N Si rather than N. This alternative model satisfies the assumptions of
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McAfee andMcMillan (1987). Thus, we can apply their Theorem 4 to show that
the optimal auction in our alternative model must satisfy the conditions in our
proposition. But a second price auction with a reserve price r = v∗ and no entry
fee, e = 0, satisfies these conditions and it does not require that the auction-
eer observes the bidders’ private signals. Consequently, these conditions must
also characterize the optimal auction when the auctioneer does not observe the
bidders’ private signals. unionsq
Proposition 1 implies a version of theRevenueEquivalence Theorem at least
for optimal allocations. It basically says that any two auction games that imple-
ment the allocation in point (i) and satisfy point (ii) give the same (maximum)
expected revenue to the auctioneer.
It is easy to find a standard auction with a reserve r = v∗ and no entry fee
which satisfies the conditions of Proposition 1 in equilibrium, e.g. a second price
auction. We could conjecture by analogy with the analysis of Myerson (1981)
that entry fees appropriately chosen may also be optimal. We show below that
this is not always the case.
Proposition 2 Any optimal standard auction must have a zero entry fee unless:
(a) “Active bidders have homogeneous beliefs” in the sense that for any i, j ∈ N
and such that Pr[i ∈ B]·Pr[j ∈ B] > 0,
E[F(v∗)N−1|Si,B  i] = E[F(v∗)N−1|Sj,B  j], a.s.
(b) “Bidders do not have private information with respect to the auctioneer” in
the sense that for each potential bidder i ∈ N, such that Pr[i ∈ B] > 0,
E[F(v∗)N−1|Si,B  i] = E[F(v∗)N−1|B  i], a.s.
Proof Suppose an optimal standard auction with reserve price r and a strictly
positive entry fee e. Since condition (i) in Proposition 1 must be satisfied in
equilibrium, any active Bidder i ∈ B, and for any realization of her signal Si,
must enter the auction if and only if her value is greater than v∗. Thus, by con-
tinuity,2 if Bidder i has value v∗, then she must get zero expected utility in the
auction for any realization of her private signal.
If Bidder i enters the auction, she pays the entry fee e. Moreover, by condi-
tion (i) in Proposition 1, she wins with value v∗ if and only if no other active
bidder has a value above v∗. The probability of this event conditional on Bidder
i’s information is equal to E[F(v∗)N−1|Si, i ∈ B]. But, if no other active bidder
has a value above v∗, Bidder i will face no competition in the auction and thus,
in equilibrium, she wins at the minimum price, i.e. the reserve price r.
2 It is easy to show that the interim expected utility of a bidder must be continuous with respect to
her value.
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From the arguments in the last two paragraphs we can derive the following
necessary condition for optimality:
e = (v∗ − r)E[F(v∗)N−1|Si,B  i], a.s. (1)
This condition can be satisfied simultaneously by all active bidders for e > 0
only if (a) holds. Similarly, the above condition can be satisfied by all types of
any given active bidder for e > 0 only if (b) holds. unionsq
The reason why there is no optimal entry fee with generality is somewhat
subtle. It is true that wemay find an entry fee that induces a given bidder to take
the entry decisions required for optimality. Hence, we could think of appealing
to the version of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem in Proposition 1 to claim
that an optimal entry fee must exist. However, this is not the case in general.
The reason is that an entry fee is an upfront payment for the option to submit a
bid whose profitability depends on the number of other bidders. Thus, a bidder’s
participation decision depends on her beliefs about the number of other active
bidders. Consequently, if these beliefs differ across bidders in some sense, we
cannot find an entry fee that induces simultaneously the optimal level of entry
of each bidder. Another difficulty is that the auctioneer needs to know what the
bidders’ beliefs are about the number of bidders, in order to be able to compute
the entry fee that induces the optimal level of entry.3
4 Acquisition of information and optimal entry fees
In this section, we show that the sub-optimality of entry fees may arise endog-
enously. The fact that the auctioneer uses an entry fee provides incentives to
bidders to acquire information about the number of active bidderswhich usually
makes the use of entry fees sub-optimal.
To prove this claim we provide a variation of the model in the previous
section. Basically, we assume that active bidders do not observe any private
signal unless they incur a cost c > 0. Moreover, and for the sake of simplicity,
we assume that this information acquisition decision is not observable and it is
taken after the announcement of the auction mechanism by the auctioneer, but
before the bidder can observe her value.
We also assume that if no active bidder acquires her private signal the con-
ditions in Proposition 2 are met. In particular this means that the following
symmetry condition must hold for any i, j ∈ N such that Pr[i ∈ B]·Pr[j ∈ B] > 0:
E[F(v∗)N−1|B  i] = E[F(v∗)N−1|B  j], a.s.
3 Wemight think that the auctioneer can avoid this problem by fixing a “contingent” entry fee that
varies with the number of bidders that submit bids. To some extent, this is actually what a reserve
price does in equilibrium: an entry fee that it is paid only if one bidder enters the auction.
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With a slight abuse of notation, we denote each of the active bidders’ signal by
Si. For simplicity, we assume that the support of each Si has only two points {s, s}
and that Si is informative of the number of active bidders in the sense that:4
E[F(v∗)N−1|B  i, Si = s] < E[F(v∗)N−1|B  i, Si = s]. (2)
To start the analysis we assume that the auctioneer announces a standard
auction with a reserve price r∗ and an entry fee e∗ which are optimal under
the assumption that no active bidder acquires her private signal. From the
arguments in the proof of Proposition 2 we can deduce that (r∗, e∗) must satisfy:
e∗ = (v∗ − r∗)E[F(v∗)N−1|B  i]. (3)
If no active bidder acquires private information, the auction is optimal. Thus,
we would want to check whether a given active bidder finds it profitable to
acquire her private information when all the other bidders do not acquire
theirs. If this were the case, there would be no equilibrium in which active bid-
ders do not acquire private information, and thus, we could conclude that entry
fees cannot be optimal.
Lemma 1 An active bidder i gets strictly greater utility when she acquires private
signal Si than when she does not if: the auctioneer uses a standard auction with a
reserve price r∗ and an entry fee e∗ > 0 that satisfy Eq. 3, all the other bidders do
not acquire their private signals, and c is sufficiently small.
Proof Suppose the conditions of the lemma hold. Equation 2 and the law of
iterated expectations imply that:
E[F(v∗)N−1|B  i, Si = s] < E[F(v∗)N−1|B  i] < E[F(v∗)N−1|B  i, Si = s],
which together with Eq. 3 implies:
(v∗−r∗)E[F(v∗)N−1|i∈B,Si=s]−e∗ < 0 < (v∗−r∗)E[F(v∗)N−1|i∈B,Si=s]−e∗.
The latter equation means that if Bidder i acquires signal Si and enters the
auction with a value v∗ (or close to v∗ by continuity), she gets strictly negative
expected utility if Si = s and strictly positive expected utility if Si = s. Thus, if c
is sufficiently low, Bidder i can strictly improve by secretly acquiring the signal
Si and revising her entry strategy when her value equals v∗ (or it is close to v∗).
unionsq
A consequence of this proposition is that in equilibrium active bidders must
acquire their private signals with positive probability. In this case, the conditions
required in Proposition 2 for optimality of entry fees would not hold and thus:
4 For instance, it is sufficient for Eq. 2 that the distribution of N conditional on Si = s first order
stochastically dominates, in strict sense, the distribution of N conditional on Si = s.
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Corollary 1 If c is low enough, a standard auction can be optimal only if it has
no entry fee, e = 0.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that when there is uncertainty about the
number of bidders the auctioneer can achieve his maximum expected utility
with an appropriate auction (e.g. a second price auction) with a reserve price.
We have also shown that entry fees are, however, sub-optimalmainly due to two
reasons: heterogeneity in bidder’s beliefs about the number of active bidders,
and auctioneer’s uncertainty about the bidders’ beliefs and hence, the optimal
entry fee, if any.
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